The biggest question is: are we winning? In my opinion, our offensive has been nothing short of amazing. A look at a map showing the ground covered so far compared to Kuwait, which was the operational theater in Desert Storm reveals how much bolder and how much faster this advance has been. So far, only 3 reinforced divisions (3rd Infantry, 1st Marine, 1st Armored (UK) ) plus unknown number of special forces have been committed to the attack. The 101st is apparently zooming along getting into position but not in the fight, the 82nd is mostly in Kuwait but transfering to the north to open a new front, and the 4th Infantry is back in the states waiting for its equipment to make it to Kuwait — originally it was to open a northern front via turkey. And in, what, five days those forces have driven through Iraq to the gates of Baghdad, and only today have they been slowed down by a sandstorm.
Have the Iraqi’s not been surrenduring? This is hard to tell, but the number in our custody (3,000 is what I last heard) is misleading. We don’t want POWs. Kuwait won’t admit them, so we’d be stuck handling them. So as our forces move north, not only have they bypassed enemy units not occupying strategic locations, they’ve also left Iraqi soldiers waving white flags along side the road. We’d rather they deserted, which they have apparently been doing in large numbers. Not that many Iraqi units have fought, and seemingly most of those have been either Republican Guard units or irregulars. By and large, most of the regular Iraqi army has decided to sit this one out. So what we have has been a few engagements in the south, and the start of the attack on the Republican Guard units around Baghdad.
Hasn’t all the news been discouraging? Actually, I think it’s been very encouraging. Our forces have gone farther faster than any other army ever has, and casualties have been light — on both sides. There have been no terrorist attacks in the US (yet). There have been no WMD attacks against forces in theater (yet). The Arab street has demonstrated, but not “risen”. The Iraqi forces have been very passive – no significant counterattacks, and the “ambush” on the supply convoy was a blocking force – they weren’t out hunting along the supply route. We’ve lost more aircraft to accidents and malfunctions than enemy fire, and it looks to me that that Apache helicopter was not shot down: there wasn’t a scratch on it — the Iraqi camerman certainly would have highlighted any battle damage to show how they shot it down — and all its weapons were unexpended. And even now its not clear that Saddam is alive and well; Centcom is apparently claiming that he was seriously wounded in the bunker attack, and his taped performances haven’t done much to contradict.
Are the Iraqi’s friendly or unfriendly? No doubt there is a mixture of both. But there are already reports that people in Basra are rebelling and the British 1st division is going to their aid. The real question is will the people cooperate, and so far the jury is still out.
Aren’t Generals warning about heavy casualties and risky battle plans? Yes, the plan has risks, but battle is risky. History shows that safe plans usually kill far more people and achieve far less in the long run than audacious ones. Yes, many generals wanted more troops. But that means more demands on supply; a more inviting target as they massed in Kuwait; and an irresistable urge to fight more battle, which would result in more dead. Yes, the coalition supply line is exposed, but so far the Iraqi’s haven’t made move to cut it off. And perhaps we’re hoping that Iraqi units expose themselves to do just that. Units in the open are far more easily attacked than those hunkered down in civilian areas. The point of the plan seems to be to get to Baghdad as quickly as possible and fight the decisive battle of the war there.
#1 by tim on March 25, 2003 - 6:51 pm
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I think for the Iraqis, as for the rest of us, this is going to be a “wait and see” sort of proposition.
I remember cringing and being very ashamed of my country during the aftermath of the first Gulf War, where we encouraged all the dissidents and Kurds to rise up against Saddam and then did nothing to help them, and allowed them to be mercilessly slaughtered by Saddam instead.
I feared that kind of inconsistancy would come back to bite us some day.
That day may have arrived.