The strategy behind this war is much different than our strategy in Desert Storm. In some ways, Desert Storm is analogous to the German offensive of 1914: Long prepared, carefully timed and orchestrated it was a sweeping right hook designed to cutoff opposing forces from their home base. This time, our strategy is much different, although I’m going to surprisingly use the same war for my analogy; this time the tactics of the German Stormtroopers of 1918 are writ large as our strategy. The Stormtroopers liked to attack at night with short but fierce artillery preparation, made maximum use of infiltration, bypassed enemy strongpoints and tried to move as quickly as possible into the enemies rear to decisively defeat and destroy his command and control.
The German blitzkreig of WWII was result the adoption of technology to provide greater mobility and firepower to these same tactics in order to break out from static defenses and force the enemy to retreat or be destroyed. In place of a WWI three trench system, Iraq is one huge defense in depth. Our strategy here seems to be to bypass strongpoints in the Iraqi south so that the decisive battle is fought in the Iraqi rear (around Bagdad) with the goal of destroying the Iraqi regime’s hold over the country. Once that is accomplished, the rest of the country can be dealt with piecemeal. Capture what you have to, leave the rest to follow on forces.
American planners could have opted for a slow grinding offensive with its main thrust north between the Tigris and Euphrates, with extensive aerial preparation, clearly delineated lines, and maximum use of firepower. But that would have meant that not only would most of the Iraqi army have been engaged, a great deal of the populated part of Iraq would have been devastated in the fighting, and a long war. While the plan adopted has its risks, it also has its rewards.
