How bad is it in Iraq? I don’t know. The only God’s eye view exists in, well, God’s eyes. I have to struggle with the trickle that has multiple filters, mainly through people who wish America ill in Iraq. The clear aversion of the press to report anything other than casualties and battles also distorts any perception of the big picture. So does this memo really tell us how bad it is? Maybe.
Here’s my problem – the memo isn’t actually presented, just a collage of excerpts by someone who could well be using it to confirm his own biases. I don’t have the context of how, why, and by whom the memo was written. Having said that it, it doesn’t paint the prettiest of pictures. On the other hand, many of the problems raised seem to be either endemic to the culture (such as the rampant corruption) or about to be corrected (such as problems with the Governing Council). I’ve seen the same corruption, fatalism, and sloth first hand working in Pakistan for three months. Frankly, other than issues over security, what’s left seems to be more about minor details than major substance.
But stepping back, I’ve wondered about the effectiveness of the CPA from a system perspective. I’m a child of the 60’s, so for me “it’s the system” really does mean something. So you have an organization that has no past and no future, which isn’t a good thing in my opinion. Having no past means that there are no systems already in place to do what the organization wants to do and the people involved don’t know each other. It also means everybody has to be recruited from somewhere else, and as the CPA has no future, who do you get to leave their homes, live in a troubled country, and who most likely won’t be able to translate success in the CPA to career advancement elsewhere.
I think these factors are in part why the military has done a better job at reconstruction than the CPA – they have a past and future — and the other part is that they don’t seem to be bound by the same contracting rules as the CPA. If you’ve ever dealt with government contracting, you know what I’m talking about. At their best, they are slow, cumbersome, and self-defeating. Couple that with trying to deal with a significantly different culture on the far side of the world, and The CPA would seem to be doomed to being lesser than its personnel; the structural defects mean that a CPA filled with first rate people would still be a second rate organization. But short of having a permanent office of occupation and reconstruction that follows their own rules, what else can you do?
For me, the bottom line is, and has been, that ultimately what Iraq turns into is the responsibility of the people of Iraq. All America can do is what we are doing – give them the chance. We cut their problems down to a manageable (but clearly not non-existent) size. Whether or not they can overcome them is up to them.
And given how absolutely lousy the other states in the region are, it won’t take much for Iraq to be a shining beacon in comparison.
UPDATE: Village Voice has posted the memo on the internet. My take of the memo is that conditions while conditions are improving, problems remain and a cloud of uncertainty overhangs the country. Only with a lot more detail:
“I want to emphasize: As great as the problems we face, and the criticisms back home, and mindful of the sacrifice that almost 600 Americans have made, what we have accomplished in Iraq is worth it. While Iraqis joke, “Americans go home — and take us with you,” the gratitude which they express is sincere and unsolicited, and not limited to a single political class. The political bickering back in the United States has worried Iraqis, who fear that a Kerry victory will mean an American withdrawal, short-term civil war, and long-term empowerment of the most radical elements of society throughout the Islamic world. Nevertheless, several Iraqi political movements have begun reaching out to Senate Democrats to keep their bases covered. I have conflicting impressions of where Iraq is going. It is easy to see progress in Baghdad.”
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“Despite the progress evident in the streets of Baghdad, much of which happens despite us rather than because of us, Baghdadis have an uneasy sense that they are heading toward civil war.”
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“We have made the most progress in Baghdad; the south may be calm, but it seems the calm before the storm. Iranian money is pouring in. British policy is to not rock the boat, and so they do nothing that may result in confrontation. This is a mistake. We are faced with an Iranian challenge. Whether Iranian activities are sanctioned or not by the Iranian actors with which the State Department likes to do business should be moot, since those Iranians who offer engagement lack the power to deliver on their promises. In Bosnia and Afghanistan, we were likewise challenged by the Iranians. In both cases, the Iranians promised their intentions were benign. In Bosnia, we rolled up the Qods Force anyway, and Bosnia has remained pro-Western in its orientation. In Afghanistan, we wrung our hands and did little, worried that the Iranians might respond to confrontation if we did anything to enforce our word. This projected weakness. Today, Iran holds as much influence over Western Afghanistan than at any time since after the Anglo-Persian War of 1857. That said, I do not think that a deliberate bombing such as we saw in Karbala or Khadimiya will be the trigger for a civil war. Rather, I worry about deeper conflicts that revolve around patronage and absolutism. Bremer has encouraged re- centralization in Iraq because it is easier to control a Governing Council less than a kilometer away from the Palace rather than 18 different provincial councils who would otherwise have budgetary authority. The net affect, however, has been desperation to dominate Baghdad, and an absolutism borne of regional isolation. The interim constitution moves things in the right direction, but the constitution is meaningless if we are not prepared to confront challenges.”
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“The interim constitution has been quite a success. I can be quite cynical about most Iraqi politicians, but I do think that it’s hard to not give Ahmed Chalabi credit for getting the deal we got. When I see the results of his maneuvering and coalition building, I wonder how much farther we could have gotten if so many in the U.S. government had not sought to undermine him at every possible opportunity. Of course we could have gotten a better deal had we come in and used our momentum, but the importance of momentum in international relations is something neither the interagency process, nor the CPA, nor the Pentagon fully grasps. If they did, we would not waste time changing “happy” to “glad” oblivious to the fact that Iraq does not operate on Washington time.”
