How do you measure how well things are going in Iraq? The press (and others) seem to be measuring progress by the inverse of the body count — if coalition deaths are down, the situation is improving, and if coalition deaths are up, the situation is deteriorating. But is that a good way to measure progress?

In WW2, American casualties increased every year of the war, and had we not dropped a couple of A-bombs on the Japanese, they would have been higher in 1946 than in 1945. Yet clearly the darkest time for us was 1942 and by 1945 it was pretty clear we were going to win. Using KIA as a proxy for progress would have provided an opposite view to reality. In Kosovo, not one US service person was KIA (at the cost of about 1000 civilian KIAs), yet the situation is as bad there as ever, and peacekeepers will be occupying Kosovo after the coalition leaves a rebuilt Iraq. 

There seems to be a feeling that progress needs to monotonically increase all the time. The reality in war is that the other guy is trying his best too, and so you have set backs, you have fits and starts, you win some and you lose some. You have to understand that and maintain some perspective. Generally, you have a much better grasp of your own problems, shortcomings, and failures than you do of the enemies, and so a natural pessimism can develop.

There is a myth that Americans won’t tolerate casualties. This is false. What Americans won’t tolerate is casualties without purpose. What casualties measure is the cost, not the progress. And while the cost is very tangible in a situation like Iraq, the progress is far more nebulous, and far more difficult to determine. Yet for an citizenry to make informed decisions about whether a war is worth it, they have to have a reasonable idea of both costs and the progress. And in Iraq, the press has let us down. The consistent message from non-press in Iraq is that progress is being made. 

There are several possibilities why the press doesn’t report on the progress — the bias that only news is bad news, the bias towards immediacy and short time horizons which means that the press does a wonderful job on telling us about the events of the day but can’t tell us the events that take a week or a month to play out, the bias of the press itself against the war, and the perception that the job of the press is to challenge the “official” story and the corresponding desire not to be a “cheerleader”. I have a feeling that all of these play their own parts in shaping the reporting from Iraq.