I was only six years old at the time, but my father, William P. Drews, worked in Operations Research for Exxon Corporation in Florham Park, New Jersey. He remembers giving a briefing on mathematical modeling to the Board of Directors, when suddenly someone came running into the room hollering, “War has broken out in the Middle East! Israel is attacking the Egyptian Army in the Sinai!”
Of course the briefing was over at that point, but my father stayed in the room. Immediately they all started talking about what to do with the Esso supertankers then headed for the Suez Canal. The first news reports were sketchy: Where was the fighting? How far would the Israelis get? Would the canal be closed? What was going on over there?
All eyes turned toward the VIP of Transportation, and they began peppering him with questions: Exactly where are the Esso tankers? Are they loaded or unloaded? How much fuel do they have? Can we get in touch with them? Can they turn around and go around the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) instead? How much advance warning do they need?
The VIP of Transportation was totally unprepared for all this, but he managed to locate the tankers near the approaches to the Suez Canal and give a rough estimate of what would be required to turn them around. They debated what would likely happen in the war, but after about a half-hour of discussion they came to the obvious conclusion: The Middle East is now a war zone, and we can’t send oil tankers into a war zone. They sent out instructions to halt the tankers immediately, and assigned somebody to figure out how to get them around the south of the African continent instead.
This was the right decision. Israel reached the Suez Canal pretty quickly, and the canal itself was blocked by sunken ships for several years following the war.
