The biggest question is: are we winning? In my opinion, our offensive has been nothing short of amazing. A look at a map showing the ground covered so far compared to Kuwait, which was the operational theater in Desert Storm reveals how much bolder and how much faster this advance has been. So far, only 3 reinforced divisions (3rd Infantry, 1st Marine, 1st Armored (UK) ) plus unknown number of special forces have been committed to the attack. The 101st is apparently zooming along getting into position but not in the fight, the 82nd is mostly in Kuwait but transfering to the north to open a new front, and the 4th Infantry is back in the states waiting for its equipment to make it to Kuwait — originally it was to open a northern front via turkey. And in, what, five days those forces have driven through Iraq to the gates of Baghdad, and only today have they been slowed down by a sandstorm.

Have the Iraqi’s not been surrenduring? This is hard to tell, but the number in our custody (3,000 is what I last heard) is misleading. We don’t want POWs. Kuwait won’t admit them, so we’d be stuck handling them. So as our forces move north, not only have they bypassed enemy units not occupying strategic locations, they’ve also left Iraqi soldiers waving white flags along side the road. We’d rather they deserted, which they have apparently been doing in large numbers. Not that many Iraqi units have fought, and seemingly most of those have been either Republican Guard units or irregulars. By and large, most of the regular Iraqi army has decided to sit this one out. So what we have has been a few engagements in the south, and the start of the attack on the Republican Guard units around Baghdad.

Hasn’t all the news been discouraging? Actually, I think it’s been very encouraging. Our forces have gone farther faster than any other army ever has, and casualties have been light — on both sides. There have been no terrorist attacks in the US (yet). There have been no WMD attacks against forces in theater (yet). The Arab street has demonstrated, but not “risen”. The Iraqi forces have been very passive – no significant counterattacks, and the “ambush” on the supply convoy was a blocking force – they weren’t out hunting along the supply route. We’ve lost more aircraft to accidents and malfunctions than enemy fire, and it looks to me that that Apache helicopter was not shot down: there wasn’t a scratch on it — the Iraqi camerman certainly would have highlighted any battle damage to show how they shot it down — and all its weapons were unexpended. And even now its not clear that Saddam is alive and well; Centcom is apparently claiming that he was seriously wounded in the bunker attack, and his taped performances haven’t done much to contradict. 

Are the Iraqi’s friendly or unfriendly? No doubt there is a mixture of both. But there are already reports that people in Basra are rebelling and the British 1st division is going to their aid. The real question is will the people cooperate, and so far the jury is still out.

Aren’t Generals warning about heavy casualties and risky battle plans? Yes, the plan has risks, but battle is risky. History shows that safe plans usually kill far more people and achieve far less in the long run than audacious ones. Yes, many generals wanted more troops. But that means more demands on supply; a more inviting target as they massed in Kuwait; and an irresistable urge to fight more battle, which would result in more dead. Yes, the coalition supply line is exposed, but so far the Iraqi’s haven’t made move to cut it off. And perhaps we’re hoping that Iraqi units expose themselves to do just that. Units in the open are far more easily attacked than those hunkered down in civilian areas. The point of the plan seems to be to get to Baghdad as quickly as possible and fight the decisive battle of the war there.

Tags: Iraq

The guy on the tape is Saddam, according to the CIA.

The Agonist is blogging up a storm on the war.

The Washington Post has all their embedded journalist stories in one spot.

Based on reactions around the blogosphere, Shock and Awe is living up to its name. Let’s hope it has the desired effect on the Iraqi military.

Will there be a response from Saddam to today’s events? I hope not.

Tags: Iraq

It seems that all the news dispatches talk about are the Marines in Kuwait. The Marines are firing arty into Iraq. The Marines are taking incoming scuds. The Marines are entering Iraq. What about the mechanized and armored units over there? How about the 101 Airmobile? I have the feeling that while the Marines are knocking on the front door, everybody else is going around to the back door. Or in terms of Sun Tzu, the Marines are the ordinary force, and everybody else is the extraordinary force.

If you’re interested in this sort of thing, the Navy maintains a site full of info on their systems: Navy Fact File. 

The Airforce calls their info Fact Sheets.

Really, those are the best sources of info; the independents grab their info from those sources plus paste and cut from DOD and contractor press releases.

Tags: Iraq

WARNING: HINDSIGHT WILL BE APPLIED

We are on the verge of war – it’s coming, the only question is it tomorrow or the day after. How did we get here? Well, certainly mistakes have been made. But let’s go all the way back to the end of the Gulf War. At the time, I supported Bush I decision to narrowly interpret the UN mandate and sign a ceasefire with Saddam. Even with hindsight, that may have been the best decision, but it certainly could have been the wrong decision. But where Bush I really failed was that while the war was well planned and carried out, the ceasefire wasn’t given much thought. And the real problem started when we demanded that Saddam disarm, but did nothing when he didn’t, and encouraged revolt against him, but did nothing when it occurred. IMHO, that was where we made our biggest mistake. We should have declared Saddam in violation of the ceasefire, and helped the rebels. But we were fearful of what came next, the possible breakup of Iraq, and the possibility of neighboring countries taking advantage of civil war in Iraq. But at that point, a minimal investment of force would have paid huge dividends.

Having survived the Mother of All Battles, Saddam began to try to rearm and end UN sanctions. And so began the endless patrols of the no fly zones, the inspection process, the salami tactics. Richard Hottelet wrote a great summation in the Christian Science Monitor in 1998:

“So far, Saddam Hussein is ahead on points. It is possible, increasingly even likely, that he will win this round. He has stood up to American saber rattling because, it would appear, he does not believe it.

Now Saddam has some things going for him. The US does not want to attack, but to get the inspectors of UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission, back to work through diplomatic means. Washington’s supporters feel the same way, while Russia, France, China, and most Arab states oppose the use of force altogether.

The US is legally entitled to go it alone and might still do so, but it will not get UN Security Council endorsement unless Saddam wildly overplays his hand. Last November, the council voted to bring him into line by imposing new travel restrictions. But those have been quietly forgotten. And today the talk is not capitulation but compromise.

Another of Saddam’s trump cards is the knowledge that even his enemies need him. This was clear in 1990, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, and in 1991 during and after Desert Storm. In successive resolutions, the Security Council affirmed Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. While Saddam’s demise or removal was devoutly wished, nothing was done. No one interfered when his troops crushed an uprising in the southern provinces.

Saddam has the advantage of winning if he does not lose; the US loses if it does not win. But what is winning? Thus far, Saddam has had the initiative. The US has “won” a number of confrontations since 1991, sending missiles into Baghdad, bombing radar sites, and rushing warships, planes, troops, and equipment to the Gulf. All of it at enormous expense.

Each time, Saddam has backed down, as he wants to appear to do now, but never entirely. Over the years he never stopped testing his limits. His international support and room for maneuver have grown. The man who invaded Kuwait and burned its oil fields, and whose biological and chemical weapons are meant at least to terrorize his Arab neighbors, now enjoys Arab backing. Meanwhile, the US is accused of a double standard: punishing Saddam for violating his obligation to disarm while making common cause with Israel, which ignores UN resolutions on southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and land for peace.

The picture is full of paradox. Economic sanctions intended to confine Saddam are a leaky sieve. He has smuggled out billions of dollars worth of oil to buy luxury goods and forbidden technology while building himself and his cronies palaces. Most of the Iraqi people have been reduced to such piteous poverty that the UN is now more than doubling its humanitarian aid.

Once again, Saddam appears to be calling the tune. He could end the crisis in a moment by acknowledging UNSCOM’s right to inspect any sites it deems suspicious. But clearly he has something else in mind.

His ultimate purpose is to end sanctions, sell his oil, and regain a free hand. To do this, he must move in stages. First, he may head off the possible crunch by enveloping it in a fog of diplomacy, partial offers, human intercessions, and obfuscation. Salami tactics would slice away UNSCOM’s legitimacy and authority. The US could veto any proposal in the Security Council to terminate restrictions or call off the monitoring and verification UNSCOM is empowered to conduct.

But, over time, Saddam’s money could crumble sanctions, and the US would hardly fill the Gulf with carrier battle groups every time he tweaked Washington’s nose. There comes a time when attack is politically out.

The prospect is not bright. Sweden’s Rolf Ekeus, former head of UNSCOM, had it right five years ago: “With the cash, the suppliers, and the skills,” he said, ” [Iraq] will be able to reestablish all the weapons. It may grow up like mushrooms after the rain.”

Bill Clinton and Tom Dashcle understood this in 1998, which is why Tom voted for a use of force resolution (which he voted against in 1990 and 2002) and Bill bombed in 1998. I don’t know that the country would have supported Clinton invading Iraq in 1998 – 9/11 truly caused a state change in this country. So Clinton did what Bush I did — bloodied Saddam’s nose and hoped that the sharks would be attracted by the blood — with equal success. So now Bush II has decided that a change in policy will result in a change in outcome, and the US stands on the brink of invasion in an attempt to address the root cause of our problems with Iraq, namely Saddam Hussein himself. 

The surprising thing isn’t that France, China, and Russia don’t support the use of force – they haven’t since the end of the Gulf War, and were very reluctant even then — but that they voted for resolution 1441. But we see now that that was a tactical maneuver, and not a strategic change. Nope, they voted for it for one reason – delay. By agreeing to it while having no intention of ever seeing it enforced, they trapped the United States into following their timetable, their interminable delays, strung along by the merest hints of cooperation by Saddam.

War is an ugly thing. But there comes a time when diplomacy is uglier, and we have reached that point. Saddam will never cooperate. If he wanted to, he would have sometime during the past 12 years. Perhaps a credible threat of force would have worked, but the French, Russians and Chinese have seen to it that the threat of force could be gotten around through non-concession concessions. At this point, we have become the parent scolding the child – if you do that again, you’ll be sorry – but never taking action. So either we agree to a policy that we know won’t work, has no hope of working and continue the charade of inspection, and will only embolden every other tyrant to acquire weapons of mass destruction, which will embolden every terrorist to strike the impotent America, and will consign the Iraqi people to ever more torture, rape, and death; or we invade Iraq and depose Saddam, killing innocents along with way, and worrying other nations about our power. So President Bush has chosen the lesser of two evils, and war will come to Iraq.

Tags: Iraq

I think most of us are anxious as war appears imminent. The whole constellation of awful possibilities is enough to give anyone pause. The fact that in a way we’re all on the front lines (some of are more frontal than others, of course) is something new. Asymmetrical warfare is the fancy term for attacking the soft underbelly rather than the armor plate of an enemy, and for those of in the United States, that means that while we are truly grateful to our fighting men and women who will be directly in harms way, we have to worry about attacks on us as we go about our daily lives. If Saddam decides to take out the JDAM factory, I may go with it. Anthrax and small pox are no respecters of person. Even people who live in East Podunk feel a threat, if not to themselves, then loved ones or fellow Americans. Even those of us who expect a quick and painless military operation with little if any terrorist counter-attacks still worry about the possibilities.

The fear, uncertainty, and doubt of the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11 have returned, and while only a shadow of its former self, it is still potent. But I remember back to my birthday in October 2001, which my wife and I celebrated with a visit to a local winery. The weather was outstanding, the fall colors were beautiful, the company was convivial: the day was a perfect antidote to the worry. So I plan to ignore the counsel of my fears, and to continue to boldly go and do those things that make life worth living.

Tags: Iraq