May 14
Speaking of photos, what happened to showing pictures of flag draped coffins at Dover? Oh yeah, that was so last week. The press got much better pictures from Abu Ghraib to show that the war is a failure in Iraq. Getting the Dover photos was sooo important the press showed them to us once. Can you imagine how important that makes the stuff they never show us, and how insignificant the stuff they show us all the time?
UPDATE: I have joined my first Beltway Traffic Jam
May 13
Phil Carter has a superb roundup of Marines decorated for valor in Iraq. These are the best of the best.
Phil also has a couple of good posts about the failure of leadership at Abu Ghraib. And while I share the concern that the leadership be held accountable as well, I figure you should always unravel and prosecute from the bottom up. That way, you can go as high as the rot goes, while if you start where you think the top is and go down, you can’t go back higher than where you started. And I’d rather have the lower ranked people implicate and testify against higher ranked people; it just wouldn’t sit right for a general to get leniency for giving up her captains.
That reminds me – so far I’ve heard of privates, corporals, and sergeants performing the abuse, and then we jump to General Karpinski — what about all the officers in between? General Taguba faults the officers from the brigade commander on down — what happened to the “on down”? Just asking.
I’m going to take Andrew Sullivan to task, and not because he can fill his blog with letters that are better than what I write, but because he seems to forget something. Andrew asks “How Dumb Is Al Qaeda” regarding how they released their miserable snuff video without waiting for the furor over Abu Ghraib to die down. And then he goes on to point out that Hitler invaded the Soviet Union as another example of the stupidity of evil.
Well. Let’s remember that killing infidels and thus demonstrating the superiority of Islam is what Al Qaeda is all about. It’s a stupid, vicious, reprehensible program beginning to end. How much strategic sense (or realism) can a movement have that longs for a return of the glories of Andalusia?
And to follow up, Hitler’s goal for WWII was to gain living space in the east, especially the Soviet Union. He wrote about it in Mein Kampf, which he wrote in the days when German authorities had the good sense to put him in jail and long before he came to power. The real example of stupidity was Hitler’s decision to declare war on the US while he was still fighting the USSR and Britain when he had nothing to gain from it.
Both are examples of a person or group staying true to their core values. Al Qaeda will never be anything but an instrument of death and terror. Their only response to any situation is to kill – the only question is one of scale.
May 11
I respect Phil Carter; when he says “check out this book”, I hit the St. Louis County Library website and reserve it. But he didn’t think something through the other day:
McCain grills Rumsfeld: Sen. John McCain’s audition for a job in the U.S. Attorney’s office went quite well, in my opinion. He asked simple, direct questions like “What is the chain of command from the guards to you, Sec. Rumsfeld?” and “What were the guards’ orders?” These questions are critical. Anyone who’s been through basic training can tell you that one of the first things you learn is your chain of command, from you to the President. Moreover, every recruit learns the general orders of a sentry, and learns that knowing one’s orders is critical to mission success. Yet, Secretary Rumsfeld could not answer either simple question. He tapdanced around the question, but ultimately, never gave Sen. McCain an answer as to the line of command from PV2 Joe Snuffy up to the Secretary of Defense. PV2 Snuffy has to know that; shouldn’t the SecDef? That’s bad.”
Think a minute, Phil, about the claim that Rumsfeld should know the chain of command of every soldier in Iraq. It’s one thing for a soldier to know his chain of command because there is only one, but we’ve got 135,000 soldiers in Iraq, and for Rumsfeld to know the chain of command for every single one of them, well, he’d be superhuman beyond the wildest dreams of the most ardent Rummy-lover. What he needs to know is what his direct reports are responsible for, and who is responsible for what among those who report to his direct reports. That’s really all he should know generally about the chain of command below him. Ditto for orders. Anything more than that is micro management.
May 4
As I said in my previous post, the abuse of Iraqi prisoners is sickening, and it only reinforces the notion in the middle east and elsewhere that Americans are a bunch of moral degenerate sex perverts — i.e. the Great Satan. It’s not very helpful in the war. But there are a couple of things I’d like to note.
When my wife was reading the paper yesterday morning, first she got mad at our soldiers who abused the prisoners, and then got mad again when she read the following:
“We are men. It’s OK if they beat me. Beating don’t hurt us, it’s just a blow. But no one would want their manhood to be shattered. They wanted us to feel as though we were women, the way women feel, and this is the worst insult, to feel like a woman.”
Then she allowed that after that remark, a lot of her sympathy disappeared. Not completely, but a a lot. He could have left it at having his manhood shattered, but he went on to say that the worst insult is to feel like a woman.
After seeing some of the pictures of the abuse, what struck me (right after “what were they thinking?”) is that the content isn’t really that much different than what the NEA used to celebrate as “art” by Robert Mapplethorpe (amongst others) — if RM had added grinning idiots to his pictures that is.
The press is worthless in trying to figure out what’s going in Iraq (and they are not much better in informing us about developments elsewhere for that matter). What’s going on in Fallujah? I can’t figure it out. I think even Wretchard is having a hard time, and he’s clearly more wired in than I am (OK, I’m not wired in at all).
On the one hand, there was all this talk of a ceasefire, yet the firing didn’t cease. And while Centcom kept saying that the Marines were only returning fire, snipers and ambush forces were infiltrating and initiating combat (and I’m not even going to mention AC-130s hosing down parts of town at night — oops). Now I’m not accusing Centcom of lying, but perhaps their pronouncements were directed more at terrorists watching CNN than Americans.
So are the Marines pulling out of Fallujah? One article says yes, another later one says no.
Clearly the correct strategy is to kill or capture all the insurgents in Fallujah; all this talk of ceasefire and pullback is disheartening. So are we screwing up? Or are we trying to create tactical confusion and trying to soothe those calling for restraint like Kofi Annan? Only time will tell.
Apr 22
How do you measure how well things are going in Iraq? The press (and others) seem to be measuring progress by the inverse of the body count — if coalition deaths are down, the situation is improving, and if coalition deaths are up, the situation is deteriorating. But is that a good way to measure progress?
In WW2, American casualties increased every year of the war, and had we not dropped a couple of A-bombs on the Japanese, they would have been higher in 1946 than in 1945. Yet clearly the darkest time for us was 1942 and by 1945 it was pretty clear we were going to win. Using KIA as a proxy for progress would have provided an opposite view to reality. In Kosovo, not one US service person was KIA (at the cost of about 1000 civilian KIAs), yet the situation is as bad there as ever, and peacekeepers will be occupying Kosovo after the coalition leaves a rebuilt Iraq.
There seems to be a feeling that progress needs to monotonically increase all the time. The reality in war is that the other guy is trying his best too, and so you have set backs, you have fits and starts, you win some and you lose some. You have to understand that and maintain some perspective. Generally, you have a much better grasp of your own problems, shortcomings, and failures than you do of the enemies, and so a natural pessimism can develop.
There is a myth that Americans won’t tolerate casualties. This is false. What Americans won’t tolerate is casualties without purpose. What casualties measure is the cost, not the progress. And while the cost is very tangible in a situation like Iraq, the progress is far more nebulous, and far more difficult to determine. Yet for an citizenry to make informed decisions about whether a war is worth it, they have to have a reasonable idea of both costs and the progress. And in Iraq, the press has let us down. The consistent message from non-press in Iraq is that progress is being made.
There are several possibilities why the press doesn’t report on the progress — the bias that only news is bad news, the bias towards immediacy and short time horizons which means that the press does a wonderful job on telling us about the events of the day but can’t tell us the events that take a week or a month to play out, the bias of the press itself against the war, and the perception that the job of the press is to challenge the “official” story and the corresponding desire not to be a “cheerleader”. I have a feeling that all of these play their own parts in shaping the reporting from Iraq.
Apr 20
How bad is it in Iraq? I don’t know. The only God’s eye view exists in, well, God’s eyes. I have to struggle with the trickle that has multiple filters, mainly through people who wish America ill in Iraq. The clear aversion of the press to report anything other than casualties and battles also distorts any perception of the big picture. So does this memo really tell us how bad it is? Maybe.
Here’s my problem – the memo isn’t actually presented, just a collage of excerpts by someone who could well be using it to confirm his own biases. I don’t have the context of how, why, and by whom the memo was written. Having said that it, it doesn’t paint the prettiest of pictures. On the other hand, many of the problems raised seem to be either endemic to the culture (such as the rampant corruption) or about to be corrected (such as problems with the Governing Council). I’ve seen the same corruption, fatalism, and sloth first hand working in Pakistan for three months. Frankly, other than issues over security, what’s left seems to be more about minor details than major substance.
But stepping back, I’ve wondered about the effectiveness of the CPA from a system perspective. I’m a child of the 60’s, so for me “it’s the system” really does mean something. So you have an organization that has no past and no future, which isn’t a good thing in my opinion. Having no past means that there are no systems already in place to do what the organization wants to do and the people involved don’t know each other. It also means everybody has to be recruited from somewhere else, and as the CPA has no future, who do you get to leave their homes, live in a troubled country, and who most likely won’t be able to translate success in the CPA to career advancement elsewhere.
I think these factors are in part why the military has done a better job at reconstruction than the CPA – they have a past and future — and the other part is that they don’t seem to be bound by the same contracting rules as the CPA. If you’ve ever dealt with government contracting, you know what I’m talking about. At their best, they are slow, cumbersome, and self-defeating. Couple that with trying to deal with a significantly different culture on the far side of the world, and The CPA would seem to be doomed to being lesser than its personnel; the structural defects mean that a CPA filled with first rate people would still be a second rate organization. But short of having a permanent office of occupation and reconstruction that follows their own rules, what else can you do?
For me, the bottom line is, and has been, that ultimately what Iraq turns into is the responsibility of the people of Iraq. All America can do is what we are doing – give them the chance. We cut their problems down to a manageable (but clearly not non-existent) size. Whether or not they can overcome them is up to them.
And given how absolutely lousy the other states in the region are, it won’t take much for Iraq to be a shining beacon in comparison.
UPDATE: Village Voice has posted the memo on the internet. My take of the memo is that conditions while conditions are improving, problems remain and a cloud of uncertainty overhangs the country. Only with a lot more detail:
“I want to emphasize: As great as the problems we face, and the criticisms back home, and mindful of the sacrifice that almost 600 Americans have made, what we have accomplished in Iraq is worth it. While Iraqis joke, “Americans go home — and take us with you,” the gratitude which they express is sincere and unsolicited, and not limited to a single political class. The political bickering back in the United States has worried Iraqis, who fear that a Kerry victory will mean an American withdrawal, short-term civil war, and long-term empowerment of the most radical elements of society throughout the Islamic world. Nevertheless, several Iraqi political movements have begun reaching out to Senate Democrats to keep their bases covered. I have conflicting impressions of where Iraq is going. It is easy to see progress in Baghdad.”
…
“Despite the progress evident in the streets of Baghdad, much of which happens despite us rather than because of us, Baghdadis have an uneasy sense that they are heading toward civil war.”
…
“We have made the most progress in Baghdad; the south may be calm, but it seems the calm before the storm. Iranian money is pouring in. British policy is to not rock the boat, and so they do nothing that may result in confrontation. This is a mistake. We are faced with an Iranian challenge. Whether Iranian activities are sanctioned or not by the Iranian actors with which the State Department likes to do business should be moot, since those Iranians who offer engagement lack the power to deliver on their promises. In Bosnia and Afghanistan, we were likewise challenged by the Iranians. In both cases, the Iranians promised their intentions were benign. In Bosnia, we rolled up the Qods Force anyway, and Bosnia has remained pro-Western in its orientation. In Afghanistan, we wrung our hands and did little, worried that the Iranians might respond to confrontation if we did anything to enforce our word. This projected weakness. Today, Iran holds as much influence over Western Afghanistan than at any time since after the Anglo-Persian War of 1857. That said, I do not think that a deliberate bombing such as we saw in Karbala or Khadimiya will be the trigger for a civil war. Rather, I worry about deeper conflicts that revolve around patronage and absolutism. Bremer has encouraged re- centralization in Iraq because it is easier to control a Governing Council less than a kilometer away from the Palace rather than 18 different provincial councils who would otherwise have budgetary authority. The net affect, however, has been desperation to dominate Baghdad, and an absolutism borne of regional isolation. The interim constitution moves things in the right direction, but the constitution is meaningless if we are not prepared to confront challenges.”
…
“The interim constitution has been quite a success. I can be quite cynical about most Iraqi politicians, but I do think that it’s hard to not give Ahmed Chalabi credit for getting the deal we got. When I see the results of his maneuvering and coalition building, I wonder how much farther we could have gotten if so many in the U.S. government had not sought to undermine him at every possible opportunity. Of course we could have gotten a better deal had we come in and used our momentum, but the importance of momentum in international relations is something neither the interagency process, nor the CPA, nor the Pentagon fully grasps. If they did, we would not waste time changing “happy” to “glad” oblivious to the fact that Iraq does not operate on Washington time.”
Apr 15
Conrad over at The Gweilo Diaries has cut back on the cheesecake posts and focused on what’s going on in the rest of the world this week to our benefit. Cheesecake is plentiful on the net; hard headed analysis is in short supply. His 9/11 Blame Game is a masterpiece all by itself, and captures my thinking (minus the swearing) perfectly.
The only thing I have to add is a look at the infamous August 6 PDB “Bin Laden determined to strike in US.” A couple of things strike me – the most obvious being how old the data in the PDB — all the threats are from the 1990s. But the very first one, at the top of the PDB, is:
Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Laden implied in U.S. television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and “bring the fighting to America.”
Did you catch that – in 1997 and 1998 Bin Laden was on our TV screens telling us that he would bring the fighting to America. So like Conrad says, if you want to see who was responsible for our lax response to al Qaida, go look in the mirror.
Apr 12
A couple of interesting and under-reported items:
Islamic terrorists are much further along in planning chemical attacks in Europe than anticipated. Found on Regnum Crucis where Dan Darling also provides some great commentary to the article.
Iraqi special forces are fighting alongside the Marines in Fallujah. And their fellow Iraqi’s are happy to see them. Found at Winds of Change and Dan Darling again.
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